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Abstract:  Assuring the security and privacy of institutional information assets is a
complex task for the line manager responsible for international and multi-national
transactions.  In the face of an unsure and often conflicting international legal framework,
the line manager must employ all available tools in an Integrated Security and Privacy
Management framework that ranges from legal obligations, to policy, to procedure, to
cutting edge technology to counter the rapidly evolving cyber threat to information assets
and the physical systems that information systems control.
Motivations
The efficient and effective operation of both public and private enterprises requires the
generation, collection, retention, use, and exchange of ever expanding quantities of
information
1
. Similarly the configurations of those information systems and their
connexions with and even controls over embedded physical systems are becoming more
complex
2
.  The access to much of that information and, a fortiori, to information
networks and to embedded physical systems must be strictly controlled and limited to
comply with laws, to assure business confidentiality, or to prevent direct financial loss.
Managing the risks associated with the use of information and an organization’s
information network is the goal of an integrated information security and privacy
program. At the operational level cyber security and cyber privacy are two sides of a
unified management task; without security there can be no privacy.
Moving beyond the individual enterprise and across national borders, the situation
becomes even more complex for the line manager.  One must recognize that distributed
science, finance, business operations, police and intelligence activities are a reality.
Increasing numbers of international enterprises rely upon information megasystems to
handle enormous quantities of data and vast network traffic with an exploding assortment
of connected wireless devices and sensors.  The operational requirements of multi-
national commercial enterprises and partnerships, multinational scientific research
projects that rely on peer-to-peer distributed computing
3
 and collaboratory tools
4
, and
                                                 
1
 “OECD Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks,” at p.7, OECD, June, 2002
2
  An example of an attempt to control a vast physical scientific research complex with an extensive
computer network is described in Deborah Agarwal, Gary Olson, Judy Olson,  “Collaboration Tools for the
Global Accelerator Network,” Final Report of the Collaboration Tools for the Global Accelerator Network
Workshop, Berkeley, CA, August 26, 2002. LBNL-532, http://dsd.lbl.gov/Collaboratories/GANMtg/GAN-
Berkeley-workshop-report.pdf
3
 For a research community perspective on the promise of GRID computing, see www.gridcomputing.com
and www.gridforum.org. Security architectures for the GRID are discussed in Mary R. Thompson,
Abdelilah Essiari, Keith Beattie, “Distributed Security Architectures – ‘Providing security services for
Grids,’” www.itg.lbl.gov/security/DistSecArch.html
international counterterrorism efforts (even those restricted solely to the European Union)
all require interconnections among complex autonomous information systems.  These
interconnections demand rigorous, multi-level authorization and access procedures that
fulfill both operational and fiduciary responsibilities defined in a complex variety of
judicial frameworks of uncertain scope
5
.
The threats that confront line management include 1) security breaches, 2) compromise
of privacy (personal and proprietary information), 3) unauthorized activities by insiders,
4) theft, sabotage and destruction of information, 5) damage to employee morale,
6) attendant public relations consequences.  Each of these items can be assigned an
economic value for the purpose of managing risk to the organization.  This set of items,
however, does not exhaust the range of threats
6
 to an institution. Prudent risk
management also aims at avoiding loss to total economic value and legal standing; for
example, 1) civil and criminal penalties, 2) liabilities, 3) loss of market share, 4) drop in
stock price, and 5) direct financial loss.  Except for items 3) and 4), public sector
employees and the governmental units for which they work face analogous risks.  In
addition, the public sector manager charged overseeing critical infrastructure resources
faces the potential of human loss in the failure of computer controlled physical
infrastructure.  The most effective approach to managing this complex of risks is the
enterprise-wide information assurance program.
Legal obligations
An institution's information security program forms the foundation for the soundness and
integrity of its business operations. Top management
7
 has a primary fiduciary
responsibility to protect corporate assets; these assets include information assets and
infrastructure.  In Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,
8
 a Delaware court
                                                                                                                                                  
4
 "The access to a remote collaborative environment, whether it is for monitoring or for control of
experiments, requires that security and access limitation mechanisms be in place, so that safeguards against
unauthorized access and privacy of proprietary data exist. …. Collaboratories will provide network based
access to very expensive equipment and must be designed to avoid several potential security and safety
problems. They must also be designed to have automated equipment failure modes with sanity checks on
all incoming data and be resistant to network-based tampering."  From “A Use-Condition Centered
Approach to Authenticated Global Capabilities: Security Architectures for Large-Scale Distributed
Collaboratory Environments”, William Johnston and Case Larsen, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory report
LBNL-38850, http://www-itg.lbl.gov/~johnston
5
 See for example the discussion of conflicting access statutes in “Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting 'Access'
and 'Authorization' in Computer Misuse Statutes”, Orin Kerr, NYU Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 1596-
1668, November 2003 at p. 1600
6
 With respect to threats to governmental information assets, cyber criminal acts can also damage
capabilities of first responders, undermine international security and development efforts, and destroy trust
in modern society. For a further discussion see E. Gelbstein and A. Kamal, Information Insecurity: A
survival guide to the uncharted territories of cyber-threats and cyber-security, United Nations ICT Task
Force and United Nations Institute of Training and Research, 2
nd
 ed., Nov. 2002,
http://www.un.int/kamal/information_insecurity.
7
 By top management we refer to the Chief Executive Officer, Board of Directors and other corporate
officers reporting directly to the CEO.
8
 Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).  This case could
provide a basis for derivative shareholder suits against corporate officers and directors.
held that, “a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a
corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate,
exists, and that failure to do so under certain circumstances may, in theory at least, render
a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.”
As the action of the U. S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in its cases against Eli Lilly
& Co.
9
, Guess?
10
, and Microsoft Passport
11
 illustrate, the implementation of an
enterprise-wide information assurance program cannot be left as an afterthought.  The
FTC has made clear
12
 that it will examine corporate security procedures where personal
data has been or may be disclosed inadvertently because of a lack of implementation of
commonly accepted security practices.  Even the possibility of inadvertent disclosure and
the mere potential for injury involving sensitive information can trigger an FTC
investigation.
The FTC consent orders in these cases offer important guidance
13
 to a wide range of
stakeholders from regulators and judges to line managers, chief information officers and
corporate counsels.  What is required for sufficient care and due diligence is an
enterprise-wide, integrated, 360 degree approach to protect the security of information. In
cyberspace privacy of information is achieved through security.
In the world of multi-national enterprises whether they be private or governmental, the
responsibilities of top managers can be exceedingly complex.  A thorny legal compliance
issue concerns the sharing of or potential access to data in multi-national operations.  For
example, the European Union (EU) has addressed meeting the standard for due diligence
with respect to safeguarding confidential data through model privacy contracts
14
developed by the European Commission (EC).  The second, revised model privacy
contract that has taken effect in April 2005 seeks to fully address the EU Directive on
Data Protection
15
 while remedying the shortcomings perceived by the business
community in the EC 2001 model contract. Unfortunately, US and EU practice
16
 are not
                                                 
9
 In re Eli Lilly and Co., Agreement Containing Consent Order, FTC No. 0123214, Jan 18, 2002,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/01/lillyagree.pdf. (Hereinafter Lily)
10
 In the Matter of Guess?, Inc. and Guess.com, File No. 022 3260, Docket No. 0223260,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/06/guesscmp.pdf.
11
 In the Matter of Microsoft Corporation, File No. 012 3240, Docket No. C-4069,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/12/microsoftcomplaint.pdf and; In the Matter of Microsoft Corporation, File
No. 012 3240, Agreement Containing Consent Order,
12
  Id. Lily
13
  See the discussion in “International Strategy for Cyberspace Security,” J. Westby, ed. American Bar
Association, August 2003, pp.178 – 182.  (Hereinafter ISCS).
14
  These EU model contracts followed proposed clauses offered by the International Chamber of
Commerce in February, 1998.  The present European Commission decisions and standard contractual
clauses can be found at “Model Contracts for the transfer of personal data to third countries ,”
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/modelcontracts/index_en.htm
15
 “Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data,” Official Journal of the European Communities of 23 November 1995 No L. 281 p. 31,
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EU_Directive_.html
16
 A detailed presentation of this issue can be found in Chapter 2 of the International Guide to Privacy, J.
Westby, ed. May, 2004, American Bar Association
fully consistent with the EU requiring greater privacy protection than mandated under US
law.
Bringing policy into action
Flawlessly designed security and privacy policies and procedures afford little protection
of institutional information assets if they are embodied only in management edicts,
documentation, and software. In fact, “organizations that adopt policies but never
implement nor enforce them may find these same policies to be a liability.”
17
 Corporate
directors and officers must bring the security program to life through the people in an
organization; security like safety is the responsibility of all personnel.  In particular, all
levels of line management bear an essential responsibility
18
 that transcends sets of
technical requirements that emanate from the chief information security officer, chief
security officer, or legal counsel.
This paper recommends an approach of Integrated Privacy and Security Management
19
 of
information that embodies several components in a cycle of continual vigilance and
improvement:
 i. Assessments of risks
20
 and liabilities
21
 in the context of business function,
 ii. Top management review of risks and formulation of policy objectives
 iii. Design of policy
22
, procedural and technological tools and evaluation of
the associated costs,
 iv. Top management review and endorsement of mitigation tools and costs,
 v. Training
23
 / commitment
24
 at all levels within the organization,
                                                 
17
 Michael Rasmussen, “Adopted But Not Implemented Security Policies May Be Your Liability,”
Ideabyte, Apr. 9, 2002.
18
  ICSC, at 151 - 161
19
  This set of activities closely parallels the Integrated Safety Management (ISM) and Integrated Safety and
Security Management (ISSM) presently promoted by the U. S. Department of Energy.
20
 Typical risks include but are not limited to a) inappropriate use, b) denial of service attacks, c) file
damage or destruction, d) physical attack, e) unauthorized control access, f) unauthorized user access, g)
non-directed attacks such as viruses, worms. and other malware, g) spam and spam relaying.
21
 In high-risk situations – for example, acquisitions, takeover attempts, shareholder suits, etc. – top
management is required to obtain professional assistance or perform adequate analyses to mitigate the risks.
See S. G. Schulman and U. S. Ottensoser, “Duties and Liabilities of Outside Directors to Ensure That
Adequate Information and Control Systems are in Place – A Study in Delaware Law and The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,” Professional Liability Underwriting Society, 2002 D&O
Symposium, Feb. 6-7, 2002
22
  The development of a security policy in consonance with institutional governance is discussed in ISCS,
Ch. 5, Sec. B.
23
 Employees and managers cannot be expected to carry out a security policy if they are not made aware of
what is expected of them. " In an “optimized” organization, training and awareness efforts ... are fully
integrated into employee career paths and sufficient budgets, resources, facilities, and instructors are
provided for training and education programs. There is continuous improvement in business processes
taking advantage of best external practices and maturity modeling with other organizations. Problems are
resolved based on root-cause analysis and organization response is efficient and fast ... Automated tools
and other education technology are used extensively and integrated into training and education programs.
External trainers are used as needed." ISCS, at 186.
24
  Due to the rapidly evolving nature of the information security threat, some experts recommend training
and testing three times per year. Dale McNulty, “Management's Role in Information Security - The 7 Top
 vi. Implementation of tools including test and evaluation of tools
 vii. Monitoring
25
 of compliance and enforcement,
 viii. Annual reviews and audits,
 ix. Adjustments to the security program.
This “enterprise program” of change management in the organization functions through a
culture of acceptance of standards, policy and ethics by all employees and managers
rather than through a regime of complex rules.
Unlike modern worker safety programs the most successful of which are based on the
assumption that all accidents can be avoided, a prudent Integrated Privacy and Security
Management System recognizes that some attacks on the information system have
minimal negative impact and that some of these attacks will succeed.  Consequently, for
large enterprises that amass extensive data on cyber-attack incidents, a system based on a
detailed return on investment (ROI) model
26
 is both practical and consistent with the "due
care" standard of liability. In the ROI approach the enterprise assesses the severity and
frequency of each type of threat, the probability of its occurrence, the impact and costs
(probable, nominal and maximum) incurred in a successful attack, the type of protection
to mitigate the threat, and its enterprise-specific costs.  One can then compare the costs of
protection with the most probable value of cyber-damage avoided to determine the ROI,
the cost effectiveness of individual protective measures.  Not deploying countermeasures
with a cost greater than the probable value of damage is both prudent and non-negligent.
Employees must comply with security policies and procedures, and management must
take enforcement action taken in instances of violations.  Both employee monitoring and
audits are important compliance tools.  Monitoring and screening, however, are fraught
with legal considerations
27
 and vastly differing legal frameworks around the globe. The
                                                                                                                                                  
Mistakes,” Nov. 4, 2002, www.surrex.com/changing_it_landscape/2002_11_04.html.
25
 " Employee monitoring of ICT [Information and Communications Technology] usage is one of the
easiest ways to monitor compliance with security policies and procedures, but it is an area increasingly
fraught with legal liability. At the outset, there are wide inconsistencies in the global legal framework in
this area. Under U.S. law  (and in most third world countries), private sector employees are afforded
virtually no expectation of privacy in the workplace698 and are not protected by the [US] Constitutional
right to privacy." ISCS, at 187.
26
  " A framework can help evaluate the costs and benefits of IT security solutions using a company's risk
profile. Using an unconventional concept, this framework bases benefit on avoided risk rather than
increased productivity. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) uses this framework to help
demonstrate to management and auditors that it is significantly less expensive to accept some damage from
cyberattacks than to attempt to prevent all possible damages. This pragmatic approach continues to enable
LBNL's cybersecurity staff to optimize security countermeasure investments and reduce spending without
sacrificing protection." Ashish Arora, Dennis Hall, C. Ariel Pinto, Dwayne Ramsey, Rahul Telang.
"Measuring the Risk-Based Value of IT Security Solutions," IT Professional, vol. 6,  no. 6,  pp. 35-42,
November/December  2004.
27
 “Under U.S. law (and in most developing countries), private sector employees are afforded virtually no
expectation of privacy in the workplace and are not protected by a constitutional right to privacy. A few
states have laws protecting privacy in the workplace; however, a notice to employees that there is no
expectation of privacy often removes their effect.  According to a review of case law by the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO), ‘Courts have consistently held, however, that privacy rights in such
communications do not extend to employees using company-owned computer systems, even in situations
where employees have password-protected accounts.’ Public sector employees are, however, afforded the
Constitutional right to privacy. U.S. common law tort theories also provide employees with remedies for
laws of the European Union afford the employee a higher expectation of privacy in the
workplace than the U.S.  Consequently multinational institutions and international
enterprises, in particular, need to ensure that employee monitoring is legal within every
jurisdiction where they conduct operations and conversely that sufficient monitoring is
performed to meet liability standards.
Internal and external audits
28
 that follow industry standards and best practices can
validate compliance and due diligence. They can also measure the overall effectiveness
of a security program.  A strong, distributed audit system
29
 should embody the following
design principles:
1) Everyone is subject to audit.
2) Audits are cross-organizational.
3) Audit accuracy is measured by cross-validation.
4) Usage records are tamper-evident.
5) Audits are fully documented to include methods, findings, and
recommendations and conclusions
Ideally, external audits are conducted through counsel, with the intention they be
privileged as an attorney work product
30
.
Technological approaches
While cyber security is not just a technological issue, it cannot be managed without up-
to-date cognizance of technological trends and without continual improvement of
technical tools to meet the evolving security challenge. In this sense the technological
face of information security must be anticipatory, not with respect to who and how
malicious parties may attack, but with respect to technological developments that enable
or facilitate entire new approaches to cybercrime or cyber terrorism. As hackers and
authors of malicious software develop new methods to circumvent and undermine
security controls, security experts must counter with more sophisticated means of
detecting intrusions in institutional networks and quarantining the compromised areas.
Consequently, robust cyber-security in the most challenging of international assignments
for information technology must presuppose vigorous supporting R&D in the
development of technological tools.
                                                                                                                                                  
invasion of privacy.  The European Union, however, affords much greater privacy to both information and
employees in the workplace due to its comprehensive data protection laws, and the EU approach is starting
to be followed globally. Thus, companies should take care to ensure that their employee monitoring policy
is in compliance with all jurisdictions where they have employees.” The ABA “International Corporate
Privacy Handbook,” J. Westby, ed., August 2003 at 146 – 147. (Hereinafter ICHP)
Management’s failure to monitor traffic on its computer systems for illegal activities such as copyright
infringement by employees can likewise lead to liability for the enterprise.
28
 ICHP at 149 – 157 presents a detailed discussion of the many factors that should be included in an
internal audit program See also Deborah Radcliff, “The Annual Checkup,” ComputerWorld, Sept. 9, 2002,
http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2002/0,4814,73993,00.html.
29
 The Information Systems Audit and Control Association, Inc.’s (ISACA’s) has the goals to advance
globally applicable standards for auditors with the skills necessary to perform information system auditing.
30
  With respect to audit reports, work product and attorney-client privilege may not provide blanket
protection from disclosure.  Limitations on these privileges are discussed in ICHP at 156 – 158.
The development of such a generally accepted approach to and set of technological tools
for information assurance has been the goal of the Information Assurance and
Survivability (IA&S) programs
31
 at US Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency
(DARPA). The strategy of DARPA IA&S program has been based on a layered set of
defenses developed in evolving generations of technology.  The foundational research for
the development of defenses is creating an ever-increasing understanding of the evolution
of information networks.  At this most fundamental level researchers
32
 have been
investigating how packet traffic will move as one increases the complexity of the
Internet.
The aim of first generation of defensive technology has been to prevent intrusions via a)
trusted computing base, b) robust access control and physical security, c) multi-level
security, and d) cryptography (AES
33
).  As intrusions do and will occur, the second
generation of security tools is designed to detect intrusions and limit damage via
firewalls
34
, boundary conditions
35
, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
36
, monitoring and
screening anomalous and unallowed activity, Virtual Private Networks, and Public Key
                                                 
31
 S. Sastry, “Testimony and Statement for the Record,” Hearing on “Cybersecurity: Getting it Right”
Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, Research and Development, Committee on Homeland
Security, United States House of Representatives, July 22nd, 2003, (hereinafter Sastry),
http://hsc.house.gov/files/testimony%20Sastry.doc. The IA&S program is specifically aimed at developing
architectures and network sub-systems that will make mission-critical networks highly survivable in the
face of large-scale cyber attacks.
32 Traffic models include geometric and topological characteristics of networks, statistical properties of
traffic (stochastic and Markov models), and analyses of contagion and virility of malware.  One goal is to
understand the traffic well enough that simulators of the Internet can be built with ~10,000 nodes for the
testing of survivability strategies and technical security components.
33
“Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 197, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf. See also “The Next Generation
of Cryptography: Public Key Sizes for AES,” Code & Cipher,
http://www.certicom.com/resources/codeandcipher/volume1/issue1/template.php?article=1-nextgen
(“AES succeeds DES and Triple-DES…. To date, AES remains the only symmetric encryption algorithm
providing at least 128 bits of security that is approved for use by U.S. government organizations to protect
sensitive, unclassified information.”).
34
 Security of the Internet, “Firewalls,” CERT Coordinating Center, Carnegie Mellon University, Software
Engineering Institute, http://www.cert.org/encyc_article/tocencyc.html#BasicSec.  For a description of the
basic technical functioning of firewalls, see Gary Smith, “A Brief Taxonomy of Firewalls – Great Walls of
Fire,” May 18, 2001, SANS Institute, www.sans.org/rr/firewall/taxonomy.php.
35
  “Propagation of false routing information in the Internet can deny service to small or large portions of
the Internet. For example, false routes can create “black holes” that absorb traffic destined for a particular
block of address space. They can also lead to cascade failures that have occurred in other types of large
routing/switching systems in the past, where the failure of one switch or mechanism results in the failure of
those connected to it, resulting in additional waves of failures expanding outward from the initial fault.”
U.S. National Cyberspace Strategy at p. 30.
36
 Intrusions are “attempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, availability, or to bypass the
security mechanisms of a computer or network.”  R. Bace and P. Mell, “NIST Special Publication on
Intrusion Detection Systems,” www.dougmoran.com/tatzlwyrm/CACHE/nist_special_pub_on_ids.pdf.
Bro, developed at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory by Vern Paxson, is an example of an open
source IDS which works well under very heavy loads in an open computing environment. Bro has now
been adopted as the IDS software used by the US Department of Energy, sectors of the Department of
Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security. ftp://ftp.ee.lbl.gov/papers/bro-CN99.ps.gz.
Infrastructure
37
.
Even the most vigilant of institutions have learned that some attacks will succeed.  The
response to this realization is research to develop a third generation of security
technology that will operate through attacks.  Such information systems are being
designed to have properties modeled on biological systems
38
; they are characterized by
intrusion tolerance, graceful degradation, self-repairing capabilities
39
, and real-time
situation awareness of and response to attacks.
Gradually the message is getting out that firewalls are no protection
40
 against insider
threats, carelessness, and incompetence.  In contrast powerful network IDS tools such as
Bro, developed at Berkeley, are vigilant against all anomalous activity whether initiated
from outside the LAN or from within.  Unlike a firewall, an IDS does not assume that
any activity initiated inside the firewall is innocuous.  For maximal protection an IDS
system should be combined with software that monitors the host computer to detect
anomalous activity, especially that which leads to root compromise or the installation of
software without the express instruction or consent of the system administrator.  The
simplest form of anomaly detection software is anti-spyware
41
 software such as Spybot.
                                                 
37
 Whitfield Diffie and M.E. Hellman, “New Directions in Cryptography,” IEEE, Transactions on
Information Theory, Vol. IT-22, Nov. 1976 at 644-54. The best known (though not the strongest) public
key system is the RSA algorithm based on factorization of large integers. R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L.M.
Adleman, “A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems,” Communications of
the ACM, Vol 21, Feb. 1978 at 120-126.
38
  Proponents of this approach advocate modifying information systems to mimic the response of  living
beings which are subject to infectious diseases (viruses and worms), genetic defects (replicated
architectural flaws), and attacks from other beings.  From that perspective one looks to the methods that
persons and other living beings use for self-protection: 1) No one expects that a person to be one hundred
percent healthy all the time.  The bio-system has built-in strategies for functioning at a reduced level until
the system self-repairs.  2) An immune system that detects (an IDS) and adapts to new threats as they are
encountered and, in many cases, can ward off infection without external assistance. The immune response
may, however, cause the biological system to operate at a reduced capacity especially when it is
overloaded. 3) A person being can describe its condition to external experts speeding diagnosis and
recovery.  4) Health protection (cyber-security) can be administered using a cost vs. benefit approach that
weighs the cost of prevention against the cost of doing nothing and come up with a cost effective policy for
health care (cyber-security). 5)  A person can incur liability. He can infect other beings; he can be taken
over and used to attack and damage other beings. This type of behavior is clearly a danger in networks.
39
 For a discussion of the utility of and the approach to self-healing systems see R. J. Ellison, N. R. Mead, T
A. Longstaff, R. C. Linger, “The Survivability Imperative: Protecting Critical Systems,”
http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2000/10/linger.html; see also H. F. Lipson and D. A. Fisher,
“Survivability—A New Technical and Business Perspective on Security,” CERT Coordination Center;
Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering Institute,
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/busperspec.pdf. A substantial bibliography can also be found at
http://www.cert.org/nav/allpubs.html.
40
 As firewalls neither stop traffic on allowed ports nor prevent the movement of what is already allowed
through the system, they are useless against insider attacks and the far more prevalent mistakes and follies
of inside users Relying primarily on the firewall is one of the seven top management errors that lead to
computer security vulnerabilities. See “The 7 Top Management Errors that Lead to Computer Security
Vulnerabilities,” The SANS Institute, http://www.sans.org/resources/errors.php.  This is not to imply that
firewalls are not valuable, only that they must be combined with other countermeasures in a layered
defense.
41
 Executable applications, deployed without adequate notice, consent, or control of a computer owner
(spyware) represent an increasingly malicious threat to personal computer systems: CoolWebSearch
Wireless communications offer enhanced flexibility and convenience at the cost of a wide
range of potential security vulnerabilities including compromise of an organization's
security boundaries.
The past two years have witnessed malicious codes
42
 with an unprecedented level of
infectiousness and virulence.  As the time constant of contagion decreases, so also must
the response time of network cyber defenses.  To make security defenses more
responsive, network architects will need to develop a deeper understanding of just how
infection traverses and expands across networks.  That understanding is a goal of two
large-scale test-bed projects
43
 in the US being conducted under joint NSF-HSARPA
sponsorship.
Contemporaneous with the appearance of cyber attacks having a worldwide effects in a
matter of less than 24 hours, the expanding demand and need for ultra-high speed
information networks is presenting the largest institutional users with the opportunity to
insist on new "rules of the road" unencumbered by the unattractive economics of
retrofitting existing equipment.   One may expect the users of next generation internets
not only to accept but also to demand the use of Internet Protocols (such as IPv6
44
) and
logging procedures that will allow rapid packet tracking for reliable attribution (and
                                                                                                                                                  
renders browsers useless by changing Internet Explorer settings and installing malicious applications;
KeenValue collects information about users and sends advertisements to their systems; Perfect Keylogger
logs keystrokes users enter, putting users' personal information and passwords at risk; Marketscore
redirects traffic from a host system to another that collects data before traffic reaches its final destination.
Moreover, the data gathered by spyware can easily be used to convert the host computer to be used as a
“zombie” (unwitting accomplice) computer in large-scale denial of service attacks. Surprisingly, an
industry-wide definition of spyware is lacking to guide anti-spyware development.
With respect to anti-spyware statutes, the legal framework is in the early stages of development. At the
Federal level in the US, five bills were introduced in the Congress in 2005; none have yet been signed into
law.  At the state level the legal framework is more advanced.  “…State lawmakers are rushing to pass
legislation. New antispyware laws have been enacted in the past three months in Arizona, Arkansas,
Georgia, Iowa, Virginia and Washington. Utah, which led the state rush with its initial antispyware statute
last year, recently strengthened its law to restrict pop-up ads and clarify penalties for violations. Spyware
legislation is pending in 20 more states.  Facing a hodgepodge of state laws and regulations, business and
consumer groups are throwing their weight behind federal legislation that would stiffen penalties and give
the FTC specific enforcement authority over spyware interlopers.” J. Ostroff, Kiplinger Business Forecasts,
Vol 6, May 27, 2005. http://www.compassweb.com/cob/kiplinger/200506/fighting_spyware.html
In the European Union, Directive 2002/58/EC (July 12, 2002), “Processing of Personal Data and the
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector” targets specific technical means that
provide access to information, store hidden information or trace the activities of users without their
knowledge. Article 5(3) of this Directive requires Member States to ensure that electronic communications
networks store information or gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of users only if
they have clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC of October 24, 1995
“Protection of Individuals with Regards to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data.”
42
  The web site of the CERT Coordination Center, Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering
Institute, publishes incident notices concerning malicious codes. www.cert.org/incident_notes/index.html.
43
 Two university collaborations including U. C. Berkeley and Carnegie-Mellon University will set up
closed networks of approximately 10,000 nodes on which they will launch malicious code of varying
degrees of virulence in presence of simulated network traffic. See Sastry, sec. 4
44
  See Lipson at p.55, footnote 52 (“For example, a shortage of IP addresses has led to the increased use of
dynamic IP addresses instead fixed IP addresses, and the use of network address translation (NAT)
allowing multiple machines to share a single globally routable IP address.”).
retribution).  Thus we may eventually see the debate over the values and dangers of
anonymity relegated to the back roads of cyberspace as institutional users "vote with their
feet."
The convergence of affordable, high quality audio-visual technology with extremely high
bandwidth information networks and with global collaborative enterprises is being
embodied in GRID computing
45
 and extensive peer-to-peer, multi-access level
environments.  This trend will extend the challenges of operating within and across
multiple legal frameworks from being the province of large multi-national corporations to
the realm of small businesses and university researchers.
Line management must be aware of the varied and numerous technological tools
46
 that
can impact privacy and security programs both with respect to  benefits and to costs.
Strong encryption
47
 can protect sensitive data and privacy at the cost of administrative
and performance overheads. Authorization and access controls (such as passwords,
biometric technologies
48
, and common access cards) are evolving rapidly to enhance
security, but often at the cost of less privacy within an organization.  Digital signatures
49
,
authentication technologies, and digital time stamps are useful for evidentiary, audit, and
                                                 
45
  The GRID implements one the characteristics of extensive computation envisioned in the earliest days of
the ARPAnet, i.e., making the network the computer.  This vision was largely postponed by the advent of
the microprocessor combined with the relatively low bandwidth and high latency of networks at the time.
The result has been the present infrastructure of and extremely large number of powerful localized
computers.  Ian Foster, Carl Kesselman, Steven Tuecke, “The Anatomy of the Grid: Enabling Scalable
Virtual Organizations,” Int’l Journal Supercomputer Applications, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2001 at 200-222,
www.globus.org/research/papers/anatomy.pdf.  For a description of a large number of functioning scientific
grids, see Ron Oldfield, “Summary of Existing and Developing Data Grids,” Sept. 11, 2001,
www.ggf1.nl/abstracts/DATA/datagrids3.pdf.
46
 See ICSC, Sec. VI.C.2.a at 208 - 222
47
 The theoretical strength of an encryption system is measured by the amount of time required by a
computer to break the coding algorithm. Governmental policies in many countries have evolved over the
past decade to favor the expanded use and dissemination of strong encryption tools, especially public key
infrastructure systems. A discussion of relevant governmental policies and responsibilities worldwide can
be found in  “Cryptography and Liberty 2000,” Electronic Privacy Information Center,
http://www2.epic.org/reports/crypto2000/overview.html#Heading7
48
 Biometric identifiers are rapidly becoming a widely required element in transportation security. For
example “In the United States, the Enhanced Border Security Act calls for the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to take a unique biometric identifier, like a fingerprint or a face scan, from
every alien entering and exiting the United States with a visa by 26 October 2004 (US House of
Representatives, 2002). The United States is also extending the requirement for biometrics to be
incorporated into tamper-resistant travel documents of other countries in its visa waiver programme as a
condition of continued participation (Fonseca, 2002; US Department of State, 2002).” Working Party on
Information Security and Privacy, “Biometric-Based Technologies.” OECD report
DSTI/ICCP/REG(2003)2/FINAL 30 June 2004 at 10.
As biometric data that characterize an individual are increasingly being considered by many states to be the
property of said individual, the use of and transfer of biometric identifiers raises particular concerns with
respect to the compromise of privacy of the individual.  Reflecting this point of view the OECD Directorate
For Science, Technology And Industry recommends that “…the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data and the OECD Guidelines for the Security of Information
Systems and Networks: Towards a Culture of Security be embodied in any biometric system design and
project.” Id at 5.
49
 A thorough review of international statutes concerning digital signatures and certification is given in
Simone van der Hof, “Digital Signature Law Survey,” http://rechten.kub.nl/simone/ds-lawsu.htm
security purposes; the cost of these measures, however, may be decreased interoperability
among an organization’s information systems.  System logs are crucial to tracking and
tracing attacks and audits, but they also constitute another large, sensitive database to
protect
50
.  Anonymizing and sanitization technologies can also be useful in protecting
privacy, but may also protect malicious agents.  In the end it is the responsibility to weigh
the benefits against the costs.
Conclusions
The Internet is intrinsically a transnational entity. Every day from every portion of the
globe new forms of cyber-threats emerge with increasing virulence.  The cyber-vandal
and cyber thief may launch their hidden by distances of thousands of miles from their
targets.  While being an indispensable staring point, local action within the enterprise
cannot alone safeguard information assets.  The private sector must continue to work with
governments to create a suitable legal framework including new, transnational
evidentiary standards
51
 for the protection of those assets in an international operating
environment.  Securing information assets will in the end require continuing vigilance
and cooperation among the business, research, technical and service provider
communities in the framework of a robust and consistent international legal framework in
which law enforcement has appropriate and sufficient forensic tools.
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Integrated privacy and security management of information depends upon the effective
implementation of policy, procedural, and technological tools utilized to help automate
the privacy plan and monitor the effectiveness of and compliance with policies and
procedures. The problem for the top management in consultation with counsel is to
decide where to operate its information systems in the three dimensional space of
security, performance and functionality, to decide what costs of security and privacy are
consistent with sufficient care, due diligence, and information system functionality.  The
result should be a regime of cost-effective risk management that is balanced with respect
to potential harm.
If all organizations establish enterprise security programs (on a scale commensurate with
their operations), if they train personnel and management at all levels throughout the
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Some providers retain records for months, others for hours, and others not at all. As a
practical matter, this means that evidence may be destroyed or lost before law
enforcement can obtain the appropriate legal order compelling disclosure.
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organization, if they take technological considerations into account and counter
vulnerabilities and risks with appropriate technologies, and if they work with
governments to promote a responsive legal framework, a global strategy for information
security will emerge.
Recommendations for the World Federation of Scientists
Cost-effective cybersecurity and privacy in nascent information societies: The integrated
privacy and security of information for enterprise users of the internet in nascent
information societies will depend upon their implementing effective procedural and
technological tools to bring to life privacy and security plans and to monitor the
effectiveness of and compliance with privacy and security procedures that meet at least
minimal standards established and tested by expert developers of information system for
small and medium sized enterprises.
This paper recommends that
A)  the development of risk management tools specifically tailored for enterprise
managers in nascent information societies that include
1) model information security plans scaled to the size and nature of
the enterprise,
2)  templates for assessing their vulnerabilities and returns on
investment for employing cybersecurity tools,
3)  training modules to promote awareness in employees in secure
computing practices and procedures.
4) self-help modules for conducting periodic cybersecurity audits.
B) the use of network security tools including strong forensic capabilities at the
early installation phases of networking hardware in nascent information societies.
C) the articulation of a uniform, transnational legal guidelines for enterprise
managers that can be embodied in the laws of nascent information societies.
Toward an effective anti-spyware strategy: Executable applications and monitoring
hardware deployed without adequate notice, consent, or control of a computer owner and
outside judicial control represent an increasingly malicious threat to the operability of
personal computer systems and to the privacy of information on these systems. Moreover,
the data gathered by spyware can easily be used to convert the host computer to be used
as an unwitting accomplice computer in large-scale denial of service attacks. With
respect to anti-spyware statutes, the legal framework is in the early stages of
development.
This paper recommends that
A) adopting industry wide definitions of spyware in both hardware and software
forms to guide anti-spyware development.
B) developing guidelines that provide a uniform legal framework to stiffen
penalties for the use of spyware and give relevant national entities specific
enforcement authority over spyware interlopers.
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